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THE ENTRAPMENT DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, AND SOME STATE COURT
COMPARISONS
RICHARD A. COWEN
It is saidthat a defendant is illegally entrapped
when the criminal design originated in the mind of
the government officer.' A definition of entrapment
concise'as any is that it is the "conception and
planning of an offense by an officer, and his pro-
curement of its commission by one who would not
have perpetrated it except for the trickery, per-
suasion, or fraud of the officer." 2 While decoys may
be used to present an opportunity to one intending
or willing to commit crime, they may not be used
to ensnare the innocent and law abiding into the
commission of crime.3
I Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
2 Sorrells v. United States, supra note I at 454. Any
effective appeal made to the impulses of compassion,
sympathy, pity, friendship, fear or hope may raise
the issue. United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160,
162 (D.C. Neb. 1927).
3 Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128, 131
(4th Cir. 1924); Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35
(8th Cir. 1921). Entrapment may oftentimes involve
narcotics or liquor violations. Generally the police
officer will supply a "stooge" with money to purchase
from a suspected offender.-Many times the suspect will
readily agree to sell the drugs or liquor; he is then
arrested and claims entrapment. In these situations the
courts hold that it is permissible to use decoys to test a
suspect
In Sherman v. United States4 the Supreme Court
recently had occasion to consider the doctrine of
entrapment in the federal courts. While the Jus-
tices unanimously agreed the defendant had been
entrapped, they failed to clarify the law of entrap-
ment in three important respects: (1) the legal
basis for the doctrine, (2) whether evidence of
defendant's prior conduct should be admissible,
and (3) whether the issue of entrapment is to be
decided by the judge or by the jury.5 This Com-
ment will consider these issues.
4356 U.S. 369 (1958). The facts are simple and
sordid. Kalchinian, a government informer, and
petitioner were under treatment to cure drug addiction
when Kalchinian asked to be supplied with narcotics.
Sherman resisted but after repeated requests capitu-
lated. The trial court submitted the issue of entrap-
ment to the jury and Sherman was found guilty. The
Supreme Court reversed, finding entrapment as a
matter of law.
5 The Court did not find it necessary to decide the
questions of the admissibility of evidence of past con-
duct or the problem of who should decide the issue of
entrapment because these issues were not argued by the
parties. The Court did indicate the majority view is to
submit the issue of entrapment to the jury. The lower
court admitted evidence of prior convictions for
narcotic offenses.
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Legal Basis of the Doctrine
Courts have differed in their conclusions as to
the legal theory supporting the defense of entrap-
ment. Estoppel, 6 public policy,7 and want of vol-
untary criminality s have been advanced. The
landmark case in this area, Sorrells v. United States,9
rejected both estoppel and public policy as the
foundation for the doctrine. To the Sarrells ma-
jority the true basis was the intent of Congress,
i.e. whether the criminal statute intended to rec-
ognize entrapment as a defense. In sustaining the
defendant's claim of entrapment the Court con-
cluded: ". . .it was not the intention of Congress in
enacting the statute that its processes of detection
and enforcement should be abused by the insti-
gation by government officials of an act on the
part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure
them to its commission."'10 Thus the Sorrells ma-
6 United States v. Lynch, 256 Fed. 983, 984
(S.D.N.Y. 1918); United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d
219 (7th Cir. 1943); United States v. Healy, 202 Fed.
349, 350 (D.C. Mont. 1913).
7 Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412, 415
(9th Cir. 1915); Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589,
591 (10th Cir. 1934); United States v. Echols, 253
Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex. 1918); Billingsley v. United
States, 274 Fed. 86 (6th Cir. 1921); Ritter v. United
States, 293 Fed. 187 (9th Cir. 1923).
s Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir.
1918). It is clear that basing entrapment on non-
voluntariness of the act is fictional. The defendant fully
intended to do exactly what was done. The only thing
that he did not intend was to allow the prosecuting
authorities to find out.
'287 U.S. 445, 446 (1932).
'Id. at 448. See also Demos v. United States, 205
F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1953).
An analogous case which decided that the intent of
the statute prohibited the conduct of the law enforce-
ment officials is Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d
169 (5th Cir. 1956). The court there held the defendant
could not be prosecuted in a federal court when his
c!-iim of entrapment would have prevailed in a state
court. This court found that defendant had been en-
trapped by state officers. Even though there was no
participation on the part of the federal law enforcement
officials the court concluded:
"The just rule seems to us to be that, when a state
officer has induced a person otherwise innocent to com-
mit a crime in order to punish him therefor, the United
States cannot take over the task of punishment by
prosecuting for the federal offense without allowing the
defense of entrapment, the same as if the inducement
had been by a federal officer. The moral wrong in
each instance is equally grave, and each is equally out-
side of and contrary to the spirit of the statute defining
the federal offense. In our opinion, the same high public
policy in the maintenance of the integrity of adminis-
tration which precludes the enforcement of a federal
criminal statute, when Government officials have lured
persons otherwise innocent to its violation . . . is suf-
ficiently broad to include acts of inducement on the
part of all officers of the law, state and federal alike."
(Emphasis added.) 237 F.2d at 176.
jority viewed entrapment as a problem in statutory
interpretation. Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and
Stone concurred in the result but disagreed with
the rationale. To them the basis for the doctrine
is found in the public policy which protects the
purity of government and its processes."
Twenty six years later in Sherman v. United
States, ' 2 the Court again split on the same ques-
tion-the legal basis for the doctrine. The majority
seems to adopt the Sorrells basis of statutory in -
tent when its opinion states that "Congress could
not have intended that its statutes were to be en-
forced by tempting innocent persons into viola-
tions." Yet the opinion is not crystal clear in de-
ciding that the basis is the intent of Congress, for
in the preceding sentence the statement appears
that "When the criminal design originates with the
officials of the Government and they implant in
the mind of the innocent person the disposition to
commit the alleged offense.. .stealth and strategy
become as objectionable police methods as the co-
erced confession and the unlawful search.' 3 This
could indicate the majority is thinking in terms
of the Supreme Court's supervisory functions over
the administration of criminal justice in the fed-
eral courts, or in terms of a violation of a constitu-
tionally protected right.
The concurring Justices read the majority opin-
ion as following the Sorrells basis of statutory in-
tent. 4 They characterize this approach as sheer
fiction; the only intent they find in the statute is
to make criminal exactly what the defendant did.
The refusal to convict is not because the defendant
did not commit the offense but rather because the
methods employed to bring about such a conviction
cannot be tolerated. Law enforcement officers can-
not be allowed to violate "vindicated standards of
justice," there must be a "fair and honorable ad-
ministration of justice."1 5 The concurring Justices
appear to found the doctrine on public policy, or
upon the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court over
federal criminal procedures.
11 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932).
The doctrine rests, rather, on a federal rule of public
policy.
12 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Chief Justice Warren wrote
the majority opinion in which Justices Black, Whit-
taker, Burton and Clark concurred.
13 Id. at 372.
11 The concurring opinion was written by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Harlan, Douglas,
and Brennan.
15 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380
(1958).
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The question arises, what difference does it make
which basis is adopted since in both cases, Sorrells
and Sherman, all Justices agreed the defendant had
been illegally entrapped? One answer is that a de-
termination of the proper basis is desirable in order
to promote clarity of analysis. 6 But there is a more
important reason. Assume Congress were to ex-
pressly declare that entrapment is no defense to a
charge of violating any federal criminal statute. If
Sorrells is correct the defense of entrapment would
be a relic of the past. No longer would there be any
prohibition against luring, enticing, or tricking an
otherwise innocent person into the commission of
a crime. The fear expressed by one court, that
weak and spineless people who find it hard to resist
temptation would be prosecuted and convicted,
might come true.17
It is undesirable that law enforcement officials,
or their agents, be given unbridled authorization
to catch and convict irrespective of the methods
employed in doing so. Such free reign is not given
in situations involving arrests, searches and sei-
zures, and confessions.' Considering the strong
judicial expressions of dissatisfaction with practices
constituting entrapment it seems most unlikely
that these practices would be tolerated by the
Court merely because Congress intended them to
be. Although it is highly improbable that Congress
would ever outlaw entrapment as a defense, the
mere possiility, though remote, illustrates the
weakness in the Sorrells position.
The greater number of cases follow the concur-
ring opinions of Sorrells and Sherman in deciding
that the correct basis is public policy." The Sorrells
majority, in rejecting this basis and assuming that
the criminal statute was enacted in furtherance of
public policy and that, consequently, courts are
not free to override the legislative determination of
public policy, overlooks an important distinction.
Public policy operates on different levels. At one
level Congress has declared certain acts to be
against public policy and therefore illegal; at an-
'sId. at 381. justice Frankfurter also fears a court
may shirk responsibility iri this area if Congressional
intent is to be the basis.
17 United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Tex.
1918).isSee Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560 (1958).
19 Supra, n. 7.
other level the courts have declared that certain
methods employed by law enforcement officers are
violative of accepted standards of justice and
therefore against public policy. There is no incon-
sistency or conflict when the public policy involved
in legislation is distinguished from the public
policy involved in police conduct.
A possible foundation for entrapment is fifth
amendment due process. While this basis has not
been advanced by the Supreme Court, and finds
only negligible support in lower federal courts,20 it
is significant that in sustaining the defense, courts
speak of entrapment as "detestation", "indecent",
"to be deplored", "intolerable", 2 "unconscion-
able" 22 --all implying that what has been done
shocks the conscience and offends a sense of fair-
ness and justice. Considering the various phrasings
of the due process test, e.g., "fair play and sub-
stantial justice",n "fundamental principles of
liberty and justice lying at the base of our civil and
political institutions",U4 "fundamental faimess", 25
"minimum standards of fairness", 2 it could be that
the courts are thinking in a due process framework
when entrapment is involved, for the judicial char-
acterizations of entrapment and of due process
violations are oftentimes strikingly similar.
Recognizing due process as the basis of entrap-
ment will give the doctrine constitutional signifi-
cance and end the sheer fiction of Sorrells' statutory
interpretation. While the same considerations will
be relevant if the basis is public policy, and the
judicial approach probably will not differ, due proc-
ess affords the more solid foundation.
20 In only one case, a recent Ninth Circuit decision,
has fifth amendment due process been mentioned as the
basis of entrapment. Banks v. United States, 249
F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957). The court discusses entrap-
ment and concludes:
"A conviction so procured is in violation of the due
process provision of the Fifth Amendment.. . 2
However this case is weak authority. The case was
sent back for a hearing and review of the record to
determine if the claim of entrapment was supportable.
21 This is the view of Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrap-
mient in the Federal Courts, 90 U. PA. L. Rxv. 245, 263
(1942).
2 Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
2International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940).
24 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937).
25 Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 467 (1958).
26 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957),
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
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Admissibility of Evidence of Past Conduct
The overwhelming majority of cases have ad-
mitted evidence of defendant's prior conduct, rea-
soning that when entrapment is raised the defend-
ant's "predisposition and criminal design are
relevant.12 7 As stated by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Becker, inducement by law enforce-
ment officers or their agents is excused when there
has been an "existing course of similar criminal
conduct" or where the accused has an "already
formed design to commit the crime or similar
crimes."2
Evidence that has been admitted to satisfy either
of Judge Hand's exceptions has not been limited
to showing prior convictions of felonies or misde-
meanors but has included hearsay testimony.Y
This is a wider range of admissibility than found
anywhere else in the law of evidence. This can be
illustrated by briefly comparing an entrapment
case with the three other situations in which a
criminal defendant's character mav be the subject
of testimony on behalf of the prosecution:
A. When a defendant places his character in
issue in a criminal trial not involving entrapment
the prosecution may introduce evidence of his
reputation in the community 30 But entrapment
cases are not limited to reputation testimony for
even the suspicions of one individual would be ad-
missible to show the officers were justified in be-
lieving the accused was criminally predisposed.31
B. If character is an operative fact, as it is in
cases of criminal libel, slander, and seduction,
courts have usually held that it may be proved by
evidence of specific acts. Reputation testimony
may not even be admissible.3 2 Entrapment is anal-
ogous since character is treated as an operative
fact yet there is no limitation as to the type of
character evidence that is admissible in entrap-
ment cases.
C. In the third situation evidence of prior con-
,27 Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1952); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451(1932); Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86
(6th Cir. 1921). Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944,
945 (10th Cir. 1950).
28 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
21 Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir.
1947), which based a finding of criminal predisposition
on hearsay and conclusional evidence. In Trice v.
United States, 211 F.2d 513, 519 (9th Cir. 1954) it was
said that hearsay was proper evidence.
0 McCOR micK, EVIDENCE §158 (1954).
31Iid.
3McCouecK, supra note 30, at §154; 1 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE §§70-74 (3rd ed. 1940).
duct is admitted to show motive, identity, lack of
mistake, knowledge, system, or intent. In a non-
entrapment case, testimony is limited to evidence
of specific acts," but when entrapment is an issue,
even though the evidence is being admitted to show
the same things, there is no such restriction.
Two criticisms have been made of the position
of the majority of cases. The first recognizes the
evidence is relevant but would refuse to admit it
because of its prejudicial possibilities. In United
States v. Washington, the court said:
"A hated and suspected man must stand before
the court like any other, to be fairly tried for the
offense charged against him, and not otherwise.
Nothing can justify.. .into a trial for a specific
offense hearsay complaints or officers suspicions
about other offenses.. .Neither suspicion nor
honest belief that defendant committed other
offenses at other times has any place in the in-
quiry."'
There is little doubt that a defendant with a shame-
ful past runs a substantial risk of the jury rejecting
his plea of entrapment. The characterization of the
accused as a "bad actor" would be difficult to over-
come. However, allowing evidence of past conduct
can work to the accused's advantage when his past
conduct is unblemished. Although in fact he may
have readily agreed to commit the crime charged,
the court or jury will give weight to a spotless
record and view his claim of entrapment more
favorably. Butts v. United States;6 and- Morei v.
United States,36 in sustaining entrapment, placed
great emphasis on the lack of prior criminality.
Thus, allowing evidence of prior conduct can be a
two edged sword. When past conduct is bad the
claim of entrapment will be weakened, but when
MMcCoRMIcK, supra note 30, at §157; WIGOORE,
supra note 32, at 215-218.
'520 F.2d 160, 162 (D.C. Neb. 1927). This court also
refused to allow evidence of similar offenses.
3' 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921). As a consequence of
numerous surgical operations, Butts became addicted
to morphine. The government used Rudolph, a friend
of Butts, to attempt a purchase from Butts. Upon the
second request he acquiesced. The court relied heavily
upon Butts's past conduct and ruled that when the
accused had never committed such offenses and had no
intent to do so, the defense of entrapment will prevail.
36 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942). Morei had a good
reputation and was lured on by the promise of great
sums of money. The court reasoned that it didn't
matter that Morei knew where to go to obtain heroin,
the fact was he never had engaged in similar activities
in the past. Morei's good conduct worked in his favor.
[Vol. 49
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past conduct is exemplary the defendant will be
looked upon with greater kindness.
The second criticism, that of the concurring
Justices in Sorrells and Sherman, denies the rele-
vance or materiality of such evidence. To them the
sole issue is the conduct of the police rather than
the character and disposition of the accused.3
Their position can best be illustrated by assuming
that police officers use identical enticements which
induce two persons to commit a crime. If one of
the offenders has a spotless past, while the other
has a long history of similar offenses, is entrapment
sustained in the former case yet denied in the
latter? If it is, there would appear to be an incon-
sistency since identical conduct on the part of
police officers will constitute entrapment and at the
same time will not constitute entrapment. The only
argument to justify such an inconsistency is that
greater latitude wil be allowed police officers when
the "target" is believed to have a criminal predis-
position.
Another problem is presented. If the accused has
been guilty of identical or even similar offenses in
the past will this justify unbridled enticement? Will
there then be no limit to what law enforcement
officials may do in an attempt to test the suspected
criminal? Forcing the majority view to its extreme,
does it follow that the worse the accused's record
the more the police can entice, lure, and deceive,
and if the accused is a hardened criminal will vir-
tually anything short of violence be permitted?
Cases which look only to the defendants past con-
duct suggest that once a record of identical or
similar offenses, or even reasonable belief of crim-
inal disposition, is found then "anything goes."3
37 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958).
8 Chief Justice Warren indicated in the Sherman
opinion that questions of relevancy still remain. The
Government had introduced petitioner's record of two
E ast narcotics convictions, but Chief Justice Warren
eld a nine-year-old sale conviction and a five-year-old
possession conviction were insufficient to prove a
readiness to sell narcotics. 356 U.S. at 375, 376.
The cases which consider only the defendant's prior
conduct seem to tacitly acknowledge that once "reason-
able belief" is shown, or similar offenses are introduced,
the defendant is a "wolf's head"-free to be lured and
deceived in any way possible. A clear expression of this
is found in Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993, 994
(5th Cir. 1933) where it is stated:
"It may be conceded that if the government agents
suspected appellant of unlawfully dealing in narcotics,
they were authorized to take steps to purchase a
quantity from him, and, although the device employed
was exceedingly indecent and beneath th6 dignity of the
It seems there must be some point beyond which
the police cannot go without violating fundamental
fairness and decency. The limits of permissible
police conduct will be difficult to define, but diffi-
culty should be no deterrent. The defense of en-
trapment should not be denied merely because the
defendant has a criminal past or because the police
have reasonable belief of criminal predisposition
for there is always the chance that even the tough-
est criminal was enticed into the commission of the
particular crime charged.
A suggested approach is to admit evidence of
past convictions of felonies or misdemeanors which
are identical with, or substantially similar to, the
crime charged, but to limit the use of such evidence
to what amounts to an impeachment of the de-
fendant.O At the same time the issue of whether
the police conduct was fundamentally unfair is rel-
evant and should be submitted to the court or jury,
whichever is to decide the issue of entrapment.
The verdict will be the result of balancing police
conduct against the objective proof of defendant's
criminal predisposition, or lack of it.
This approach preserves the strong points of the
majority and minority positions while eliminating
the most glaring injustice now present-the ad-
mission of hearsay, rumor, and suspicion to
"prove" criminal predisposition. Felonies or mis-
demeanor convictions for identical or substantially
similar offenses are relevant because in the interests
of effective law enforcement society is willing to
allow the government freer reign when pursuing the
naturally wary criminal. Admitting prior convic-
tions will undoubtedly weaken the claim of entrap-
ment but the question of whether police methods
violated a sense of decency and fairness must be
answered regardless of how bad the accused's past
conduct may be. Nor is it to be feared the pendu-
lum will swing too far in favor of the accused so
that a defendant with a spotless record will always
United States, the transaction would be sufficient to
support the conviction." (Emphasis added.)
See also Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 944, 945
(10th Cir. 1950); Trice v. United States, 211 F.2d 513
(9th Cir. 1954), admitting the defendant had been en-
trapped but sustaining the conviction because the
officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Trice was
criminally predisposed.
2' The tests suggested by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, (2d Cir. 1933)
would still be the cornerstone in viewing defendant's
prior conduct. Testimony as to prior conduct would be
admissible as some evidence of an existing course of
similar criminal conduct of an already formed design to
commit the crime or similar crimes.
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escape prosecution, for the government may still
succeed in proving ready compliance.40
The argument may be advanced that by pre-
venting evidence of the reasonable belief the officers
had that the accused was criminally predisposed,
prosecutions will become more difficult and many
defendants will escape conviction. If it is believed
that effective prosecution requires evidence of the
reasonable belief to be admissible then such evi-
dence might be admitted, but it should be balanced
against the conduct of the police. No matter how
40 If the government can show ready compliance the
claim of entrapment fails. Masciale v. United States,
356 U.S. 386 (1958); Casey v. United States, 276 U.S.
413 (1928); Rodriguez v. United States, 227 F.2d 912(5th Cir. 1955); United States v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 49(7th Cir. 1951).
bad the defendant's past record may be, this bal-
ance must be struck.
Admittedly this is a difficult approach. Yet it
probably is no more difficult than deciding ques-
tions of negligence or intent. Each case will turn
on its particular facts and a black letter rule of
law may never be possible. As Judge Hand said in
discussing entrapment, "We are acutely aware of
the nebulous outlines that emerge but we see no
escape from defining them as occasion arises..."I'
1' United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d
Cir. 1933). See Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827,
834 (6th Cir. 1942); United States v. Perkins, 190
F.2d 49, 51 (7th Cir. 1951), where it is stated:
"Our courts have found it difficult to state an all-
embracing rule which will define the course of eonduct
or provocation by government officers constituting cn-
trapment."
Is Entrapment an Issue for the Judge or the Jury?
The third question on which the Sarrells ma-
jority and concurring Justices divided, and which
was left unresolved by Sherman, is whether the
judge or the jury is to decide if the defendant has
been entrapped. The overvhelming weight of
authority is that entrapment presents a question
of fact for the jury unless subject to a ruling as a
matter of law.42 Probably one reason in support of
this view is that the defense of entrapment is gen-
erally raised as part of a plea of not guilty.-
The concurring Justices in both Sorrells and
Sherman contend the issue is for the court, since
sustaining a claim of entrapment is a means of
preserving judicial integrity. The court should be
the proper agency to protect its own processes. 44 A
second argument is that a jury verdict does not
provide a sufficient guide for future law enforce-
ment activities. The wise administration of crim-
inal justice demands the evolution of "explicit
standards" which only the court can provide.45
4 United States v. Markham, 191 F.2d 936 (7th Cir.
1951); Nero v. United States, 189 F.2d 515 (6th Cir.
1951); Yep v. United States, 83 F.2d 41 (10th Cir.
1936); Butler v. United States, 191 F.2d 433 (4th Cir.
1951); United States v. Brandenburg, 162 F.2d 980
(3d Cir. 1947).
43 Sorrdls held that the defense of entrapment is
part of a plea of not guilty. The government's con-
tention-that if the defense is available it must be
pleaded in bar to further proceedings and could not be
raised under a plea of not guilty-was overruled.
The issue of whether raising the defense of entrap-
ment admits commission of the criminal acts is beyond
the scope of this comment. See Note, 70 H,\Rv. L. REV.
1302 (1957), for a discussion of this issue.
11 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932);
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (1958).
15 Sherman v. United States, supra note 44 at 385.
While it is true that an expression by the judge
will be more enlightening in clarifying a basic ap-
proach to the issue, it is doubtful that "explicit
standards" can be formulated because of the ne-
cessity of considering entrapment on a case to case
basis with emphasis on the particular facts of each
situation.
As a means of protecting judicial processes, dis-
missing a case because of entrapment is similar to
the court's power to punish for contempt or to ex-
clude illegally seized evidence or confessions taken
during an unnecessary delay in bringing the pris-
oner before a magistrate. The power of the trial
judge to punish for contempt is necessary as a
"mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its
active manifestation, against obstruction and out-
rage. '46 In McNabb v. United States, involving the
admissibility of a confession, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter expressed the view that "Judicial super-
vision of the administration of criminal justice in
the federal courts implies the duty of establishing
and maintaining civilized standards of procedure
and evidence." 7 The defense of entrapment has
the same policy basis in its refusal to allow the
abuse of judicial processes by over-zealous law en-
forcement officials. Entrapment can also be analo-
gized to a decision on a question of jurisdiction,
since both involve the problem of whether the
doors of the court are open to the particular liti-
gation. It should be noted that questions of con-
16Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954);
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952), says that
the court will protect the processes of orderly trial.
17318 U.S. 332, 340 (19431.
[Vol. 49
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tempt, admissibility of confessions, and jurisdiction
all involve questions of fact so it is oversimplifying
the issue to say entrapment is for the jury because
it depends on questions of fact.
There is a further reason why the issue of en-
trapment should be for the judge. When a defend-
ant is shown to have a record of prior convictions
the judge is less likely than a jury to be prejudiced
against the accused because of such evidence. And
if the approach to the problem of entrapment
which has been suggested above is adopted, the
judge is more competent to handle the difficult
problem of balancing the defendant's prior conduct
against the methods employed by law enforcement
officers. His judicial training and experience qualify
him for rendering such decisions on matters of
degree.
STATE COURT COMPARISONS
The doctrine of entrapment has not received the
analysis in state courts that it has in federal courts.
When the defense is raised, state courts have gen-
erally disposed of it by setting forth an encyclo-
pedia-type definition and then holding that the
facts do, or do not, sustain the defense.
Illinois decisions present an example of the
superficial treatment given the doctrine. In People
v. Outten the issue is stated as whether the crim-
inal intent originated in the mind of the officer or
the accused. It is there stated that "As a general
rule, entrapment can exist only when the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the entrapping
officer, and if such intent arose in the mind of the
accused there is no entrapment... .4 If this test
means what it says, the defense of entrapment
would always prevail for the particular offense
charged is always the result of some law enforce-
ment official's plan. In devising ways of testing a
suspect, believing that the suspect will behave as he
is known or reputed to have behaved in the past,
the officer will provide an opportunity for the com-
mission of crime. If the suspect swallows the bait,
he wil. have committed the exact crime the officers
planned. Thus, unless a defendant is caught while
engaging in the commission of a crime other than
the "test" crime, the offense for which he will stand
Is 13 Ill.2d 21, 147 N.E.2d 284 (1958).
' Id. at 286. See also Beasley v. State, 282 P.2d 249
(Okla. Ct. of Crim. App. 1955); People v. Jackson, 42
Cal.2d 540, 268 P.2d 6 (1954); State v. Poague, 72
N.W.2d 620 (Minn. 1955); Scott v. Commonwealth
303 Ky. 353, 197 S.W.2d 774 (1946). All these cases
formulate the test of entrapment as depending upon in
whose mind the criminal intent first originated.
trial will be the particular crime devised by the
police. Since the police thought of the particular
crime first, cannot it be fairly said that the intent
originated in the mind of the officer? This indicates
that viewing entrapment as a matter of who first
formed the intent to commit the offense may be a
catch word formulization but is otherwise un-
sound. The basic inquiry must always be whether
the particular police methods employed were per-
missible.
Another Illinois decision appears to place the
defense of entrapment on the good faith of the
officers. In People v. Clark the court states that
"It is not an instigation or solicitation to commit a
crime for an individual or officer having reason to
believe another is committing a crime to furnish
an opportunity for the commission of the offense if
the purpose is, inz good faith, to secure evidence
against a guilty person and not to induce an in-
nocent person to commit a crime." (Emphasis
added.)50 There is no doubt that the issue of en-
trapment does not depend on whether the officers
acted in good faith. A police officer could honestly,
and with all sincerity believe that it was necessary
to confine and interrogate a suspect for days in
order to crack his story, but this would not be
permissible, nor will unrestrained searches and sei-
zures be permitted merely because police officers
may in good faith believe they are necessary to law
enforcement. A claim of entrapment should be
considered no differently. The limits of permissible
police conduct are not defined by the good faith of
the officers, but rather by standards of fairness and
decency.
When it comes to a consideration of the basis of
the entrapment doctrine, state courts exhibit the
same divergence as the federal courts. In re
Horvitz5" the Illinois court discusses both the ma-
jority and concurring Sorrells opinions. The only
indication the Illinois court provides as to the basis
it would place entrapment upon is a statement
that public policy is the "simpler ground."52 Some
states place the doctrine on public policy; 4 one
state court, purporting to follow Sorrells, advances
estoppel as the correct foundation5 while another
50 7 Ill.2d 163, 130 N.E.2d 195 (1955); People v.
Lewis, 365 Ill. 156, 6 N.E.2d 175 (1937); People v.
Ficke, 343 Ill. 367, 175 N.E. 543 (1931).
51360 Ill. 313, 196 N.E. 208 (1935).
52 Id. at 327.
53State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 219
(1952); Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 189
S.E. 329 (1937).
"State v. Marquardt, 139 Conn. 1, 89 A.2d 9
(1952).
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state reads Sorrells as establishing public policy as
the basis.55 Thus, there is not only a difference
among the states as to the basis of the doctrine but
there is also a difference in interpreting Sorrells v.
Uisited States. Finally, the Wisconsin court has in-
dicated its belief that the doctrine is not based
upon constitutional considerations, for in State v.
Hockma-n it said: "With respect to the defense of
entrapment the court is not called upon to deal
with constitutional considerations as it is in the
case of the validity of a search warrant or of a
search made without warrant. The defense of en-
trapment is not in such a category."5"
Two states, New York and Tennessee, appear to
reject the defense of entrapment, 57 but it is argu-
able that in spite of the case law in both states, the
defense may still be available.
In People v. Schacher- the defendant was charged
with violating a New York State War Emergency
Act regulation by selling a bottle of scotch whiskey
for more than the established ceiling price. In re-
jecting the claim of entrapment the court states:
"The evidence fails to support such a claim. In
any event it is well settled that entrapment is not
recognized as a defense in New York State."'
While this appears to be a clear rejection of the
doctrine, the court itself suggests a reason why the
rejection may be limited to the facts of the case. In
discussing the regulation violated by the defendant
the court indicates, in the following statement,
that intent was not a necessary element of the
crime. "In the opinion of the court the regulation
in question is malum prohibita and under well es-
tablished principles an intent is unnecessary. The
mere commission of the act enjoined is sufficient
to justify a conviction. °60 Whether the defendant
knew he was committing an offense is immaterial;
all that mattered is he sold the whiskey for more
than the ceiling price. However, when an offense
is involved where the mens rea, or criminal intent,
:5 Falden v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 549, 189 S.E.
329 (1937).562Wis.2d 410, 76 N.W.2d 446 (1957). The court
fails, however, to state what category it is in.
-7 A third state, Florida, has by statute abolished the
defense of entrapment in a limited number of cases.
22 FLA. STAr. ANN. §838.11 (Cum.Supp. 1957) pro-
vides:
"The defense of entrapment is hereby abolished and
prohibited in prosecution for bribery, offering bribes,
accepting bribes, and offering or accepting unauthorized
compensation for performance or non-performance of
official duty....
58 47 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1944).
59 Id. at 372.
0 Id. at 373.
is an ingredient of the offense, the mere commission
of the prohibited acts may not be enough to con-
vict. An intent must be established, and if entrap-
ment is claimed it becomes necessary to consider
the voluntariness of the defendant's conduct. In
other words, when a criminal intent is a requisite
to the commission of a crime, it becomes important
to decide if the defendant committed the crime
voluntarily or if he was lured or enticed into its
commission. If this argument is accepted, then the
question of entrapment in cases requiring a crim-
inal intent is still open in New York. Entrapment
would be unavailable only in cases where intent is
not an element of the crime, i.e. in cases where the
mere commission of the prohibited acts is sufficient
to sustain a conviction.
In three Tennessee supreme court decisions it is
said that the defense of entrapment is not recog-
nized. The latest expression is found in Goins r.
State,61 but in that case no acts of state officers or
their agents were involved. An employee of the
victim had agreed to leave the store doors open so
the defendant could enter and steal. In Palmer v.
Stat 62 the court again says that the defense is not
recognized, although there is no discussion nor are
any reasons advanced. This case can be explained
as an example of ready compliance, for the de-
fendant sold whiskey to a plainclothes detective
without the least hesitation; moreover it is not
clear that the defendant really relied on entrap-
ment as a defense. From the report of the case
defendant relied mainly on an alibi, contending he
was somewhere else at the time the crime was
allegedly committed. Thomas v. State 3 rejects en-
trapment yet there is no discussion of why it is un-
available.
Hyde v. Stateu is the case that seems to lay at
the bottom of Tennessee's rejection of entrapment
as a defense. Yet a careful reading of Hyde indicates
that the defense was not denied because entrap-
ment was not recognized, but because the facts of
the case did not support the defense. Nowhere did
the Hyde decision expressly reject the availability
of entrapment; Hyde merely denied entrapment
because of defendant's ready compliance.
Thus it is arguable that there has not been an
authoritative expression on the question of entrap-
ment by the Tennessee courts, and whether the
doctrine is recognized is an open question. Ten-
61 192 Tenn. 32, 237 S.W.2d 8 (1950).
2 187 Tenn. 527, 216 S.W.2d 25 (1948).
0 182 Tenn. 380. 187 S.W.2d 529 (1945).
6 174 S.W. 1127 (Tenn. 1915).
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